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Abstract
Managing retirement payouts generally revolves primarily around securing adequate retirement income
and assuring the continuity of such income for as long as the retirees live. Many commentators have
suggested that the most efficient strategy to deal with these issues for risk-averse retirees is to annuitize
retirement benefits. However, these commentators recognize that relatively few retirees actually choose
life annuitization (the so-called “annuity puzzle”). One reason for this is the bequest or inheritance motive
which involves using income-tax-favored retirement plans to pass wealth to the heirs (probably children)
of the retiree or to charity. This chapter discusses the concepts, strategies, and constraints on using taxfavored retirement plans as wealth transfer devices.
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Chapter 6
Retirement Distributions
and the Bequest Motive
G. Victor Hallman

Planning for and managing retirement assets as well as the payouts from
these revolve around securing adequate retirement income and assuring
the continuity of such income for as along as retirees (and their spouses)
live. Most people are concerned about a possible lack of adequate retirement income and the risk that they will outlive their assets. Often advisers
suggest that a logical and efficient strategy to deal with these issues for
risk-averse retirees is to annuitize the retiree’s assets or benefits over his or
her lifetime (or if married, over the joint and last survivor lifetimes of the
retiree and spouse). Another suggested strategy is to use a combination of
life annuitization and an installment withdrawal plan. These approaches
are indeed efficient for providing lifetime retirement income. They are
based, however, on the implicit assumption of limited resources for retirement income, and hence they presume the need to disburse, and probably
consume, those resources over the lifetimes of the retiree and his or her
spouse.
Despite the logic of annuitization or the combination approach, we
are left with the so-called ‘annuity puzzle,’ which notes that relatively few
retirees actually purchase immediate life annuities or choose life annuitization for their retirement benefits. One reason (of several) cited for
this ‘annuity puzzle’ is the bequest or inheritance motive.1 This chapter
explores the nature, limitations, and strategies used in implementing the
bequest motive as part of a retiree’s decision-making about how to manage
his assets in retirement.
In what follows, we first discuss what we mean by the bequest motive and
how current law permits tax-favored transfers to heirs. Next, we turn to the
constraints limiting these transfers, and finally discuss current strategies
making these more feasible. We conclude that US tax law provides tax
incentives to encourage the provision of retirement income via minimum
distribution rules. In practice, however, these rules and other tax law provisions now permit significant tax-favored wealth transfer and charitable
giving strategies.
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Nature and Significance of the Bequest Motive
By the bequest or inheritance motive, we mean using income-tax-favored
(i.e., tax-deferred or tax-free growth) retirement plans as vehicles to pass
wealth to heirs (usually children and grandchildren) of the retiree and
spouse, or to charity after the last of their deaths. To accomplish this, the
retiree (participant in the case of qualified retirement plans, and owner
in the case of individual retirement accounts and annuities) and spouse
during their lifetimes plan to draw down the balance of their retirement
plans as little as permitted by the tax law (and by their personal needs)
so that assets can continue to grow tax-deferred or tax-free (in the case
of Roth IRAs) for as long as possible. They also seek to arrange plan
beneficiary designations so that after their deaths their beneficiaries have
the opportunity to maintain income-tax-deferral or tax-free growth for as
long as possible (generally over the beneficiaries’ life expectancies). This
is the so-called ‘stretch’ IRA strategy.2 As US tax law and Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) regulations now stand, with proper planning, such incometax-deferral or tax-free growth can easily continue for 50 or more years and
extend over the life expectancies of the owner, his or her spouse, and their
children (and possibly grandchildren)—in other words, over two or more
generations.
Some researchers contend that, even if assets are needed during retirement (beyond the minimum distributions required by law), it is preferable
from an income tax standpoint to first take such distributions from taxable
investment accounts (investment portfolios held outside of tax-advantaged
plans), and only later from tax-advantaged retirement accounts.3 This is
the strategy of tax-efficient sequencing of lifetime distributions from different
categories of accounts. While such sequencing does seem somewhat to
increase asset values, we conclude that it may not a quantitatively significant
strategy for wealth transfer.4
Retirement plan distributions are also a highly tax-efficient way to fulfill
a person’s charitable giving objectives, as they represent gross income for
federal income tax purposes both to the retiree during the retirement
years and to plan beneficiaries after the retiree’s death. They are income
in respect of a decedent (IRD). But since charities are tax-exempt, they
realize no income tax liability when such distributions are payable to them.
Charitable gifts at death are also deductible for federal estate purposes. As
a result, some suggest that retirement plan assets, and other IRD items for
that matter, should be used to fulfill a person’s charitable objectives (Hoyt
2002a). While charitable giving may be, in itself, a socially desirable motivation, again we see the tax-driven use of retirement assets for purposes other
than providing retirement income to the participant or owner and spouse.
It may also be noted that in the case of tax-deferred retirement assets made
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Table 6-1 Number of and Growth in High Net Worth
Individuals: North America 2001–5

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

High Net Worth
Individuals (millions)

Change over Previous
Year (%)

2.2
2.2
2.5
2.7
2.9

—
0
13.5
8.0
7.4

Source: Capgemini and Merrill Lynch (2004: 2; 2006: 4–5, 31).

Au: Is “year”
meant in place
of “decade”
here?

payable to (or rolled over to) tax-exempt charities, the government never
collects income taxes on the deferred amounts.
Accordingly, the bequest or inheritance motive can involve many complex goals, including the deferral of distributions from retirement plans
for long periods so that income-tax-deferred (or tax-free) assets pass to
at least one generation beyond that of the original participant or owner;
and the use of retirement assets to make otherwise desired charitable
gifts.5 Of course, implied in the planning for these goals is the notion
that the original participant or owner has sufficient wealth, income, and
other resources so that he need not consume most of the retirement assets
during retirement; in other words, he is probably a reasonably high net
worth individual. Table 6-1 indicates that the number of high net worth
individuals (defined as persons holding $1 million or more in financial
assets) doubled in the first five years of the twenty-first century.
The significance of retirement assets (qualified retirement plans and
IRAs) in the gross estates of decedents whose estates filed federal estate
tax returns is also growing over time.6 Table 6-2 indicates that such percentages have doubled over the last decade of the 1990s. One explanation
for this trend is the emergence of individual account-type plans that enable
participants to leave retirement assets to heirs. In the future, decedents will
Table 6-2 Retirement Assets as a Percentage of
Gross Estates for Federal Estate Tax
Returns Filed: 1992, 1995, and 2001

1992
1995
2001

Male Decedents (%)

Female Decedents (%)

5.8
7.8
11.2

2.3
3.2
5.5

Source: Johnson and Mikow (1999) and Eller (2005).
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increasingly be able to leave more account balances from these types of
plans in their gross estates. Further, the substantial increases in qualified
plan contribution and benefit limits, compensation limits, section 401(k)
employee elective contribution limits, and IRA contribution limits, enacted
in the Economic Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) of 2001
and made permanent by the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006, are
enabling higher net worth individuals to contribute significant amounts
to tax-advantaged plans. Of course these changes have benefited from the
long trend of generally favorable economic and investment performance,
particularly for common stocks, producing good investment returns for
many individual account plans.
These factors have combined to generate growing retirement assets in
the hands of individuals who can afford to delay taking benefits during
their retirement, and who can also consider using a portion of these assets
to satisfy charitable giving objectives. This development, paired with tax law
complexity regarding retirement plan distributions, has led to considerable
planning activity among estate planners and wealth management professionals to aid clients in arranging for the distribution of retirement plan
assets (Hoyt 2002a; Choate 2004, 2006).

Tax and Economic Constraints on Wealth Transfer
Before discussing specific planning strategies that may be used to enable
tax-advantaged retirement plans to fulfill bequest or charitable motives, it
is useful to briefly describe the tax rules intended to assure that these retirement benefits will, in fact, be used for retirement. Possible economic constraints on using these benefits for wealth transfer purposes are also noted.

Tax Rules Affecting Timing of Retirement Plan Distributions
One philosophy guiding tax law holds that income tax advantages to retirement plans are intended to encourage their adoption to provide retirement
income (rather than for wealth transfer or estate planning purposes). In
practice, the idea would be that retirement plan distributions should be
taken neither too early (presumably for current consumption or other
nonretirement purposes) nor too late (presumably for wealth transfer
purposes). The specific rules that embody this policy objective include the
10 percent penalty tax on ‘premature distributions’; age limits on distributions from plans such as Roth IRAs and 401(k) plans; and the required
beginning date (RBD), minimum distribution rules, and 50 percent penalty
tax on insufficient distributions [i.e., less than the minimum required
distributions (MRDs)].
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The 10 percent penalty tax (also called the section 72(t) penalty) is levied
on retirement plan distributions to participants or owners who are younger
than age 591/2 . There are a number of exceptions to this penalty tax, but
they do not change the fundamental purpose just noted. The minimum
distribution rules apply to qualified retirement plans, section 403(b) plans,
IRAs, and section 457 plans. For lifetime benefits of participants or owners,
minimum distributions must begin by an RBD which is specified as the first
of April of the calendar year following the year in which the person attains
age 701/2 . The person must take MRDs for the year in which he or she
attains age 701/2 and for each subsequent year (by December 31 of that
year).7
During the participant’s or owner’s lifetime, the MRDs are based on his
or her life expectancy from a Uniform Lifetime Table as stipulated by the
Federal Government (see Appendix Table 6-A1). To calculate the MRD
for a particular year, the account balance at the end of the previous year
(or plan year) is divided by the distribution period shown in the Table for
his or her attained age in that distribution year. The distribution periods
decline with age but never reach zero. Thus, they are recalculated each
year since that year’s life expectancy becomes the applicable divisor.8 The
effect of this is that MRDs will continue over the person’s lifetime, although
the amounts will normally increase with time. The distribution periods
under the Uniform Lifetime Table are based on the joint life expectancies of the participant or owner and a theoretical person (beneficiary) 10
years younger. This generally is true regardless of whom the beneficiary
may be.9
The Uniform Lifetime Table is beneficial for the bequest motive. It will
call for relatively low MRDs for many years after a person attains the RBD.
Depending on the investment return inside the plan, this means retirement
plan account balances may continue to grow, and hence be available for
beneficiaries, for many years after minimum distributions must begin. For
example, assuming plan assets have a 6 percent investment return, the
MRD will not exceed that year’s investment return inside the plan until
the participant or owner reaches age 83. If plan assets can earn 8 percent,
the corresponding age is 89.
Roth IRAs are not subject to the minimum distribution rules for distributions during the owner’s lifetime; they do apply, however, to plan beneficiaries
after the owner’s death. This lifetime treatment is also very beneficial for
the bequest motive. It means Roth IRA account balances can grow taxfree without any diminution for an owner’s entire lifetime, which may
be 20, 30, or more years after retirement, before passing to a beneficiary at the original owner’s death. Roth IRAs have grown significantly
since they were first introduced in 1997. For example, in 2002 taxpayers
contributed ∼$42.3 billion to individual retirement arrangements of which
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about $13.2 billion or 31.2 percent were contributions to Roth IRAs. Such
Roth contributions have increased about 14.1 percent from the year 2000
when such data for IRAs were first produced. In addition, in 2000, 3,989,390
taxpayers rolled over ∼$204.4 billion into traditional IRAs. Of course, when
the total fair market value of IRA assets in 2002 of about $2.6 trillion are
considered, Roth IRA assets represented only about 3.0 percent because
Roth plans are of such recent origin (Bryant and Sailer 2006).
Recent legislative developments are likely to increase the proportion of
assets in Roth plans. For one, the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 eliminated (for years after December 31, 2009) the
$100,000 or less modified adjusted gross income eligibility requirement for
conversion of a traditional to a Roth IRA. Thus, for 2010 and thereafter,
persons with modified adjusted gross incomes in excess of $100,000 will
be able to convert some or all of their traditional IRAs to Roth IRAs by
paying income tax on the converted amount. This should increase such
conversions substantially because higher income persons are more likely to
be able to afford the income tax on conversion and to benefit from the taxfree investment growth and no minimum distribution requirements during
their lifetimes than lower income traditional IRA owners. In addition, the
PPA of 2006 made Roth 401(k) and 403(b) plans permanent. These Roth
plans were created by EGTRRA in 2001 for 2006 and thereafter, though
the provision for these (along with the rest of EGTRRA) was to ‘sunset’
in 2011. In 2006, the PPA nullified the ‘sunset’ as to the pension and IRA
provisions of EGTRRA, in effect making them permanent. It is possible that
many employers may have hesitated to add a Roth 401(k) option to their
benefit plans, possibly because of the greater administrative cost, but more
likely because they were unsure that this option would survive by 2011. Now
they are.
The minimum distribution rules are different for distributions to plan or
IRA beneficiaries after a participant’s or owner’s death: in particular, they
depend on who the beneficiary is and whether the participant or owner
died before or after his or her RBD. In general, if the only beneficiary is
a ‘designated beneficiary,’ who would be an individual, two or more individuals, or a see-through trust (defined later as one having only individual
beneficiaries), the benefits can be made payable over the beneficiary’s life
expectancy using the Single Life Table (as in Appendix Table 6-A1). The
individuals (persons) for this purpose may be either a surviving spouse
or individuals other than a surviving spouse. Minimum distributions to
a see-through trust are based on the life expectancies of the individual
beneficiaries of the trust.
In general, if a surviving spouse is the only designated beneficiary of a
plan, let us assume an IRA, he or she can: (a) leave the IRA in the name
of the deceased spouse and treat it as an ‘inherited IRA’; taking minimum
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distributions usually over the surviving spouse’s life expectancy using the
Single Life Table but recalculating the remaining life expectancy at the
surviving spouse’s age each year;10 or (b) treat the IRA as his or her own,
naming his or her own beneficiaries, not having to begin distributions until
the surviving spouse’s RBD (aged 701/2), and using the Uniform Lifetime
Table with its much slower MRDs. The second choice is usually preferable
for deferral purposes.
If the designated beneficiary is an individual or individuals other than a
surviving spouse, the account balance generally can be payable over the
beneficiary’s life expectancy or the life expectancy of the oldest beneficiary in the case of multiple beneficiaries (without separate accounts)
using the Single Life Table but with a fixed-term or ‘reduce-by-one’
approach (no recalculation). This may be less advantageous for deferral
purposes.
Finally, if there is no designated beneficiary (which might occur, e.g., if the
beneficiary is a trust that is not a see-through trust, a charity, the decedent’s
estate, or multiple beneficiaries when at least one is not an individual),
the no-designated-beneficiary rule applies. In this case, if death occurs
before the participant’s or owner’s RBD, a five year rule applies and the
account balance must be paid out by the end of the fifth anniversary of
the decedent’s death. If death occurs on or after the RBD, the account
balance must be paid out at least over the deceased participant’s or owner’s
remaining life expectancy using the Single Life Table with no recalculation
(i.e., applying the fixed-period method). These ‘no-DB’ rules are the least
favorable for deferral purposes.
As noted previously, after a Roth IRA owner’s death, the post-death minimum distribution rules just described also apply to Roth IRA beneficiaries.
Of course, the distributions to them are tax-free just as they were during
the original owner’s lifetime.

Economic Constraints on the Bequest Motive
The bequest advantage from ‘stretching’ retirement plan payouts depends
almost entirely on income-tax-deferral or income-tax-free investment
growth of the payouts. Therefore, a fair question is how valuable incometax-deferral is from an economic or investment viewpoint.
Qualified dividends on stocks and long-term capital gains are currently
taxed at a top rate of 15 percent (at least through 2010); by contrast,
distributions from qualified retirement plans, traditional IRAs, and other
retirement plans are taxed as ordinary income. Further, most capital assets
get a stepped-up income tax basis at death, while most retirement plan
distributions are IRD. Accordingly, some commentators have questioned
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the economic value of deferral in retirement plans versus direct after-tax
ownership of assets.11 But deferral in a retirement plan will always be
advantageous, assuming that the applicable income tax rate at the time
of contribution is the same as at the time of distribution, and that the
asset allocations inside the plan and outside the plan are such that the
before-tax total returns are the same for both, while after-tax investment
returns outside the plan are less than the returns inside the plan (because
the outside return is subject to income taxation). This is true, in essence,
because the retirement plan participant or owner is getting tax-deferred
investment income on money that otherwise would be paid in taxes; he is in
a sense investing the government’s money. But the degree of this advantage
depends on a host of factors including the length of the period of deferral,
whether there is a rising or declining stock market, the level of interest rates
and other investment returns, turnover of common stocks outside the plan,
and the availability of investment products (such as index mutual funds)
that affect such turnover, whether there will be step-up in basis at death,
investment expenses, and others.
Another economic question is what income tax rates will be at the time
of the retirement plan distributions. At present, individual income tax
rates are at a historically low level. Yet conventional wisdom argues that
income tax rates during a person’s retirement years tend to be lower
than during the working years. As a rule, higher tax rates at distribution
rather than during the contribution phase would favor tax-free investment
growth (Roth plans) and be relatively disadvantageous for tax-deferral
plans. The reverse would be true for lower rates at distribution than at
contribution.
Finally, contributions to tax-advantaged retirement plans involve inflexibilities (due to plan requirements and tax law contribution limits), lack
of liquidity (due to tax law limits on distributions), possible penalty taxes,
and the risk of possible future disadvantageous changes in the tax law.
Participants and owners also may forgo other tax advantageous uses of plan
contributions and assets, such as making gift-tax-free transfers to children
and grandchildren.

Strategies for Wealth Transfer and Charitable
Giving with Retirement Benefits
Various strategies may be used to make tax-effective transfers of retirement
assets within the family and as charitable gifts. In our overreview, we assume
that the participant or owner has a substantial qualified retirement plan or
IRA individual account balance at retirement.
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The ‘Stretch IRA’ Concept with Spouse as a Designated Beneficiary
This is the simplest and most effective tax-deferral strategy. The participant
or owner names a spouse as a beneficiary of the qualified plan or IRA
account balance, with perhaps the children or trusts for the children as
contingent beneficiaries. Upon the participant’s or owner’s death, the surviving spouse normally rolls over the participant’s qualified plan account
balance to an IRA, or elects to treat the decedent’s IRA as an own rollover
IRA.12 The surviving spouse then may name a beneficiary or beneficiaries
for the IRA, often the children (or trusts for the children). The original
beneficiaries (the children) also may name successor beneficiaries in case
they do not outlive their life expectancies. This spousal rollover IRA strategy
can result in the deferral of taxable distributions (in the case of traditional
IRAs) or continuation of tax-free investment growth (in the case of Roth
IRAs) under the minimum distribution rules for the spouse’s lifetime and
then over the life expectancies of the children. This is the classic ‘stretch
IRA’ approach-distributing benefits over one or more life expectancies.

An Example of a Spousal ‘Stretch IRA’
As an example, assume that Homer Smith is about to retire from the XYZ
Corporation and he is 65 years old (his birthday is February 1). He and his
wife, Mary, aged 61, have two children: Homer Jr., aged 35, and Hortense,
aged 28. They all are in good health. Homer and Mary appear to be happily
married, have no prior spouses, and both are competent in investing and
property management (Mary having been a successful accountant for many
years). Their nonretirement asset picture is summarized in Table 6-3.
Table 6-3 Nonretirement Assets of Homer and Mary Smith: A
Hypothetical Example
Assets and Ownership
Principal residence (owned by Homer and Mary as
joint tenants with right of survivorship)
Summer home (owned by Homer and Mary as joint
tenants with right of survivorship)
Individually owned securities (common stocks,
bonds, and CDs) owned by Homer
Individually owned securities (common stocks,
bonds, and CDs) owned by Mary
Cash and other assets (owned by Homer and Mary
as joint tenants with right of survivorship)
Source: Author’s computations.

Value ($)
600,000
400,000
1,000,000
500,000
100,000
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As Homer’s retirement approached, Homer and Mary have determined that their asset allocation (other than their real estate) should be
50 percent in a diversified portfolio of common stocks (selected conservative individual stocks and mutual fund shares), 45 percent in bonds
and CDs (diversified as to maturity, issuer, and credit quality), and 5 percent in cash equivalents. In light of good asset location planning, they
decide to hold their taxable bonds and CDs in tax-deferred or tax-free
retirement accounts, and their common stocks, tax-exempt bonds, taxable bonds, and their cash equivalents individually. They expect an average annual total return on their common stock portfolio of 8 percent
(3 percent qualified dividends and 5 percent long-term capital gains) and
an annual current yield on their bonds and CDs of 6 percent. They also
plan to rebalance their portfolio periodically to maintain their desired
assert allocation. Homer’s employer, the XYZ Corporation, has a defined
benefit (DB) pension plan covering both retirees (under a qualified jointand-survivor annuity form) and a 401(k) plan. Homer and Mary will
also receive government social security benefits. Mary also has a vested
pension promise from a previous employer that will commence when
she reaches age 65. Homer and Mary will be eligible for Medicare and
XYZ Corporation at present has a retiree medical plan that will cover
them.
Homer’s and Mary’s objectives are to maintain their living standards
during retirement, to protect themselves against medical expenses and
possibly custodial care expenses during retirement, to have an emergency
fund, possibly to make lifetime (annual exclusion) gifts to their children,
and possibly to make gifts to charity. Assuming that these objectives can be
met from their pension, social security, and individually held investment
income (as it would appear they can), at the last of their deaths they
would like to leave as much as possible to their children (and hopefully
grandchildren) with as little tax shrinkage as possible.
Given this scenario, assume that Homer has a $1.5 million 401(k)
account balance in his XYZ Corporation plan and decides to directly transfer
(roll over) this account balance to his own traditional IRA at age 65. He
names Mary as a designated beneficiary of the IRA. Homer and Mary plan
to take only the MRDs from this IRA so that it can continue to grow taxdeferred for as long as possible for the benefit of their children. Homer
need not take any distributions from the IRA until the required beginning
date at age 701/2 (in about five years).13 Using the Uniform Lifetime Table,
Homer’s distribution period (life expectancy) at age 70 is 27.4 years, which
in effect requires a minimum distribution of 3.6496 percent of the IRA
account balance as of the end of the previous year.14 If we assume that
account balance is $2,007,338 ($1.5 million at 6 percent for five years),
the minimum distribution for Homer’s 701/2 years is $73,260, which is
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substantially less than the 6 percent interest income (of $120,440) from
the IRA for that year.15
Homer continues to take increasing minimum distributions until his
death which we shall assume to be at age 86. To the extent that the minimum
distribution for the year of his death was not taken by Homer, it must be
taken by Mary as a beneficiary. Assuming Homer’s estate plan calls for
an ‘optimal marital deduction’ strategy (use of the marital deduction only
until it reduces the federal estate tax on Homer’s estate to zero and then the
balance of his estate to a credit-shelter or by-pass trust or gift—a ‘reduce to
zero formula’), there will be no federal estate tax payable at Homer’s death.
The IRA account balance payable to Mary will qualify for the federal estate
tax marital deduction and hence will be deductible for federal estate tax
purposes.16
As a general principle, making income-tax-deferred retirement plan
account balances payable to a surviving spouse also is an efficient estate tax
strategy because they represent IRD and so the distributions will be taxable
as ordinary income to the beneficiary (the surviving spouse). Therefore,
the income tax payable on those distributions (which must be paid in any
event) comes from the surviving spouse’s assets and hence will not be in
his or her gross estate when the surviving spouse subsequently dies, thereby
reducing his or her federal estate tax liability.
After Homer’s death, as the designated beneficiary of his IRA, Mary
elects to treat the IRA as her own and names her two children as equal
beneficiaries. She must begin taking minimum distributions in the year
following Homer’s death since she then would be age 83 (beyond her
RBD). Her distribution period at age 83, using the Uniform Lifetime Table
(since she is treating the IRA as her own), is 16.3 years, so she effectively
must withdraw (and pay tax on) 6.1350 percent of the account balance
(calculated as of the end of the year of Homer’s death) by December 31
of the year following his death. She then must continue taking increasing
minimum distributions until the year after her death. Assuming further that
Mary also dies at age 86 (four years after Homer’s death), the remaining
IRA account balance is payable equally to her and Homer’s two children
as designated beneficiaries of Mary’s IRA.17 Since they are designated
beneficiaries, the account balance may be paid out to them over their life
expectancies using the Single Life Table and fixed-period (one year less)
method.
At Mary’s death, the remaining IRA account balance will be included
in her gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. It normally will also
result in a federal estate tax in her estate unless she has remarried and
names a surviving spouse as a beneficiary or leaves it to charity (which seem
unlikely in this case). Her will normally should specify (in a tax clause)
that any death taxes attributable to the tax-advantaged retirement account
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should be payable from other assets in her estate so the full amount of
the retirement account can continue to grow tax-deferred (in this case) or
tax-free (in the case of a Roth IRA).
The IRA now will be payable to the two children as an inherited IRA. As of
Mary’s death, Homer Jr. will be age 60 and Hortense will be 53. When IRAs
are payable to multiple beneficiaries, the general rule is that the account
balance must be paid out over the fixed-period life expectancy of the oldest
beneficiary, which here is Homer Jr. But if separate accounts are established
for each beneficiary by December 31 of the year following the year of
Mary’s death, each beneficiary can use his or her own life expectancy in
calculating MRDs. Assuming such separate accounts are created, under the
Single Life Table Homer Jr.’s life expectancy would be 24.4 years (at age
61) and Hortense’s life expectancy would be 30.5 years (at age 54), as of the
year following the year of their mother’s death when they must begin taking
minimum distributions. In that year, the percentage withdrawals would be
4.0984 percent and 3.2787 percent, respectively. The applicable divisor (life
expectancy) for each would then be reduced by one each year thereafter.
Therefore, the IRAs must be exhausted (entirely distributed) by the 25th
and 31st years, respectively.
The IRA distributions will be taxed as ordinary income to the children.
However, since there was federal estate tax attributable to the IRA account
balance paid by Mary’s estate, and the distributions to the children are IRD,
the children are entitled to an itemized income tax deduction each year
for the pro rata share of the federal estate tax paid on their retirement
plan distributions. This is to avoid double taxation of distributions of IRD
items.
Given this example then, Table 6-4 shows the periods of income-taxdeferral made possible by this ‘stretch IRA’ strategy in this situation starting
Table 6-4 Periods of Income-Tax-Deferral for the Smith Example:
The Spousal ‘Stretch IRA’ Strategy
Distributee and Age
Homer: the ages of 65 through 69: no distributions
Homer: age 70 through 86: minimum distributions
using Uniform Lifetime Table
Mary: age 83 through 86: minimum distributions using
Uniform Lifetime Table
Homer, Jr.: age 61 through 85+: minimum distributions
using Uniform Lifetime Table (fixed period)
Hortense: age 54 through 84+: minimum distributions
using Uniform Lifetime Table (fixed period)
Source: Author’s computations; see text.

Period of Deferral
5 years
17 years
4 years
24+ years
30+ years
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with Homer’s retirement at age 65. It is interesting to observe that in this
rather straightforward example, income-tax-deferrals continue for more
than 30 years after the deaths of the original plan participant, Homer, and
his spouse, Mary. This was actually a longer deferral period than applied
during the lives of the participant and his spouse.
If any part of this retirement plan had been a Roth IRA, no distributions
from the Roth would be required over Homer’s or Mary’s lifetimes since
there are no MRDs from a Roth IRA for the owner’s lifetime. In this case, it
would result in 26 years of tax-free investment growth. At Mary’s death, the
Roth IRA account balance would be in her gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes and would be an inherited Roth IRA for the children for income
tax purposes. Thus, the children must begin taking minimum distributions
at this point over their life expectancies (normally using separate accounts)
under the fixed-period method. These distributions would be income-taxfree (not IRD), so no itemized deductions for federal estate tax paid on
the retirement account would be available. Clearly the ‘stretch’ Roth IRA
approach offers substantially more income-tax-advantaged bequest potential than even the ‘stretch’ traditional IRA.

Possible Problems with Spousal Rollover ‘Stretch IRAs’
While this approach normally can provide the best purely tax-driven deferral (bequest) potential, it is not without possible nontax problems. First,
the retirement account is made payable to the spouse as a designated
beneficiary and so this spouse controls the account after the original owner’s
death. Hopefully, the surviving spouse will follow the just described rollover
‘stretch IRA’ strategy and also name the deceased spouse’s children as beneficiaries of the survivor’s rollover IRA. However, there may be a number
of practical impediments to this actually happening. It may be a second
(or more) marriage and the survivor may not be willing to designate the
deceased spouse’s children of a prior marriage as beneficiaries of his or
her rollover IRA. Similarly, the surviving spouse may remarry and have a
new family to consider in planning for the retirement account.
A second concern is that management of the rollover IRA will be in the
hands of the surviving spouse and he or she may not be experienced or
competent concerning investments and wealth management. Further, the
surviving spouse may decide that deferral is not for him or her and for
various reasons (good or bad) take the retirement money now, despite
paying higher taxes (the consumption motive). But there also may be valid
estate planning reasons for taking more than the required minimum distributions, such as the need for funds to make annual exclusion (or other gifttax-free) gifts to children or grandchildren or for charitable contributions.
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These same issues may apply to children named as beneficiaries of the
original IRA or the spousal rollover IRA.
Additionally, when retirement benefits constitute the bulk or a large part
of an estate, and the estate is large enough to attract potential federal estate
taxation, there may not be enough non-retirement-plan assets (directly
owned assets) to fund fully a credit-shelter or by-pass trust (or gift) when
executing an optimal marital deduction strategy. Assuming no lifetime
taxable gifts, at an estate owner’s death the optimal marital deduction
calls for an amount equal to the applicable exclusion amount to be placed
in a credit-shelter or by-pass trust (or gift) that does not qualify for the
marital deduction in the decedent’s estate and is not included in a surviving
spouse’s gross estate. The remainder of the decedent’s estate is left so as
to qualify for the marital deduction. This reduces the federal estate tax
on the estate of the first spouse to die to zero and diminishes the tax on
the estate of the second spouse to die by the tax that otherwise would be
payable on the amount in the by-pass trust or gift. When retirement plan
assets are needed (and used) to fund the credit-shelter or by-pass trust,
they are not available for a spousal rollover ‘stretch IRA,’ which offers
the best income-tax-deferral result. The result can be a planning dilemma
between maximum income-tax-deferral (saving) and maximum estate tax
saving.
This complexity can be illustrated with the Homer Smith example. If
Homer were to die soon after he retired at age 65 (in 2007), his gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes would be $3,050,000 (ignoring his
DB plan). Assuming funeral expenses, estate administration expenses and
debts of the estate total $50,000, the net value would be $3,000,000. An
optimal marital (reduce to zero formula clause in his will) then would cause
$2,000,000 to be placed in a by-pass trust (presumably with Mary and the
children as beneficiaries) or gift and $1,000,000 would pass to Mary so as to
qualify for the marital deduction (of which $550,000 would be from their
two homes and other jointly owned assets). But Homer’s probate estate
only has $1,000,000 of assets (individually owned securities) with which to
fund the by-pass trust and pay the estate’s debts and expenses. Therefore,
if the by-pass trust (or gift) is to be fully funded, Homer (or Mary by
disclaimer) will need to have about $1,050,000 of his IRA account balance
payable to the by-pass trust (or payable to their children or to trusts for
their children) to make up the full $2,000,000 now permitted at his present
asset values. In such a situation, a decision must be made either to give up
part (or all) of the income-tax-deferral (or tax-free growth) advantages of
a spousal rollover IRA and fully fund the by-pass trust, or to maintain the
entire IRA account balance as a spousal rollover IRA with its income tax
advantages but to underfund the by-pass trust or gift which may result in
higher estate tax at the surviving spouse’s subsequent death.18 Naturally,
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this issue will depend on the size of the applicable exclusion amount at the
person’s death, which is uncertain at this time; the proportion of the gross
estate consisting of retirement assets; and even the status (existence) of the
federal estate tax itself.

The ‘Stretch IRA’ Concept with Other Individuals
as Designated Beneficiaries
Individual beneficiaries other than a surviving spouse also may take minimum distributions over their life expectancies, but they must use the Single
Life Table and the fixed-period (one year less) method. Other individual
beneficiaries cannot roll over a qualified plan to their own IRA or treat a
decedent’s IRA as their own, but they may have ‘inherited IRAs’ payable
over their life expectancies. This can allow them considerable ‘stretch’
opportunities, depending on their ages. These individuals often would
be children, but they also might be grandchildren, siblings, other family
members, or domestic partners or companions.
Returning to the case of Homer Smith, for example, if for some reason Mary were not in the picture (previous death, divorce, or more than
adequate assets of her own), Homer could name his two children as
beneficiaries of his 401(k) savings plan or of his rollover IRA. If Homer
were tragically to die early, say at age 65, and assuming separate accounts
are established for each child, Homer Jr.’s life expectancy at his age 36
(one year after Homer’s death) would be 48.5 years (or a 2.0618 percent
minimum required distribution) while Hortense’s life expectancy at age 29
would be 54.3 years (or a 1.8416 percent minimum distribution). Thereafter, their expectancies would decline by one each year until the account
balance for each would be exhausted in the 49th year for Homer Jr. (his age
85) and in the 55th year for Hortense (her age 84) regardless of whether
they lived longer than those ages.
At Homer’s death (assumed at age 65 here), if he had not yet rolled
over his 401(k) qualified savings plan account balance to his own IRA
and his children were the equal beneficiaries of the 401(k) plan, under
the provisions of the PPA of 2006, the children (as nonspouse individual
beneficiaries) could transfer their account balances to an ‘inherited IRA’
for each with each IRA being in Homer’s name as decedent but payable
over the child’s life expectancy as beneficiary. If Homer had done a rollover
to his own IRA prior to his death, the IRA custodian would treat each child’s
separate account as an ‘inherited IRA’ in Homer’s name (as decedent) but
payable over each child’s life expectancy as beneficiary.
Naturally, if Homer were to die at a more likely age, such as the previously
assumed age 86, his children’s life expectancies would be shorter—age
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57 and 27.9 years for Homer Jr. and age 50 and 34.2 years for Hortense.
However, substantial income-tax-deferral (or tax-free growth) still would be
possible. Grandchildren (none are assumed in the Homer Smith example)
could also possibly be named as individual beneficiaries. However, they
would be ‘skip persons’ to the participant or owner and so the generationskipping transfer tax would have to be considered.
As noted earlier, children or other individual beneficiaries may have
some of the same practical problems with ‘stretch IRAs’ as a surviving
spouse as beneficiary. Wealth management professionals often comment
anecdotally that children beneficiaries may want the money now (even
though taxed) rather than being ‘dribbled out’ over their life expectancies.

Trusts as Beneficiaries
It sometimes is desirable to have retirement benefits payable to a trust as
beneficiary rather than to a spouse, children, or other individuals. This
can be for all the estate planning, family, control, investment management,
and allowance for discretion reasons that trusts are generally used. But
when retirement benefits are made payable to trusts, income-tax-deferral
and other advantages often are sacrificed at least to some degree for trust
administration. Thus there are income tax and other trade-offs in using
retirement benefits to fund trusts.

Trade-offs with Trusts as Beneficiaries
One such trade-off is that income-tax-deferral often is reduced. The general minimum distribution rule is that retirement plan account balances
payable to other than individual designated beneficiaries must be paid out
by the end of the fifth anniversary of the participant’s or owner’s death.
This rule applies to trusts unless a trust meets the tax law requirements to
be a see-through trust.
Under the minimum distribution rules, a see-through trust as beneficiary
allows distributions to be paid from the plan (normally an IRA) over the
life expectancy of the oldest trust beneficiary (using the Single Life Table
without recalculation) or over the separate life expectancy of each trust
beneficiary if a separate subtrust is named for each trust beneficiary in the
plan’s beneficiary designation form (the separate accounts rule). To be a
see-through trust, all trust beneficiaries must be individuals, they must be
identifiable from the trust instrument, the trust must be irrevocable and
valid under state law, and the trustee must supply certain documentation
to the retirement plan administrator.
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Another possibility is to make a trust a conduit trust. To be such a trust,
the trust instrument must require the trustee to distribute to an individual
trust beneficiary any distribution the trustee receives from the retirement
plan. In other words, unlike a see-through only trust, the trustee cannot
accumulate plan distributions in the trust to be distributed later under the
terms of the trust and perhaps in the trustee’s discretion. For minimum
distribution purposes, a conduit trust beneficiary is treated as if he or she
had been named individually as the sole plan beneficiary. Therefore if, for
example, a surviving spouse is beneficiary of a conduit trust, the MRDs
would be over his or her life expectancy, using the Single Life Table but
with recalculation. If any other person is beneficiary, the MRDs would be
over his or her life expectancy but without recalculation (i.e., the fixedperiod method). For a surviving spouse, this does not produce nearly the
deferral possibilities as the spousal rollover ‘stretch IRA.’
Another trade-off is that the effective trust income tax rates normally
will be higher than those actually applying to individual beneficiaries.19
Therefore, retirement plan distributions to trusts that are accumulated in
the trust (i.e., not paid out currently to trust beneficiaries) normally will
be taxed at a higher rate. Other trade-offs are trustees’ fees (although
these percentage charges may be roughly equivalent to the expense ratios
of most mutual funds) and the time and costs of creating trusts. Further,
if married participants of most qualified retirement plans are involved,
spousal consent to any beneficiary designation other than the spouse will
be required under the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA).

Qualified Terminable Interest Property (Q-TIP) Trusts
as Beneficiaries
To illustrate how alternative trust structures might work, we alter Homer
Smith’s situation to assume that Homer has been married before; he has
a daughter, Abigail, from his first marriage; and he is divorced from his
first wife. Let us further assume that Mary and her stepdaughter do not
get along at all. Under these circumstances, Homer may fear that Mary will
not name Abigail as an equal beneficiary (along with their two children) of
any rollover IRA of Mary’s if he names Mary as outright beneficiary of his
qualified plan or IRA (the control factor). However, Homer does want his
retirement plan account balance (or part of it) to qualify for the federal
estate tax marital deduction.
A classic estate planning solution for this kind of situation is to leave
property to the spouse (here, Mary) in a qualified terminable interest
property (Q-TIP) trust with trust income payable to the spouse (Mary)
for life, and at Mary’s death the remainder (the trust corpus) presumably
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going to Homer’s three children equally in this case. Such a Q-TIP trust
qualifies for the marital deduction at Homer’s death and so is deductible
by his executor in determining any federal estate tax liability (which will be
reduced to zero under the previous assumptions), but leaves to Homer (in
drafting the trust terms) where the property goes after Mary’s death.
The difficulty with having an IRA account balance (as opposed to other,
non-IRD property) payable to a Q-TIP trust is a significant loss of incometax-deferral (or tax-free growth).20 For example, assume Homer does name
such a Q-TIP trust as beneficiary of his IRA (i.e., life income to Mary
remainder to his three children), and the trust is a see-through trust but
not a conduit trust. In this case, if Homer dies at age 86 with Mary being
age 83 the next year, the MRDs would be based on Mary’s life expectancy
under the Single Life Table on a fixed-period basis (no recalculation).
Therefore, the IRA account balance at Homer’s death would have to be
paid out to the trust in only 8.6 years. Further, MRDs in excess of the
income earned inside the IRA would be taxed to the trust at its likely
higher tax rate.21 But under this scenario, these after-tax excess MRDs will
accumulate in the trust and be available for distribution to the remainder
beneficiaries (the children) after the surviving spouse’s death. Therefore,
there will be a bequest potential here, but once the distributions leave
the IRA, there will no longer be income-tax-deferral or tax-free growth
advantages.
If, however, the Q-TIP trust is structured as a conduit trust, all distributions
from the IRA will be passed through the trust to the surviving spouse. The
advantages of this are somewhat longer deferral (because the MRDs are
calculated using the Single Life Table but with recalculation) and probably
lower income tax rates because the distributions all will be taxable to the
surviving spouse.22 But the disadvantage here from a bequest point of view
is that, assuming the surviving spouse lives a reasonable period of time, very
little will be left in the Q-TIP trust at his or her death to go to the remainder
beneficiaries (the children).

By-Pass Trusts as Beneficiaries
As noted previously, it may be necessary for estate tax reasons to have
retirement plan benefits payable to a by-pass or credit-shelter trust. But
the disadvantages of doing so are that income-tax-deferral likely will be
substantially reduced, higher trust income tax rates may apply, and any
income tax paid by the trust on IRA distributions that are not currently
paid out as income to trust beneficiaries (i.e., are accumulated in the trust)
will reduce trust corpus and hence lessen the estate tax skipping advantage
of these trusts.
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How fast MRDs must be paid to any see-through trust depends on who
the trust beneficiaries are. In general, the MRDs will be based on the life
expectancy of the oldest trust beneficiary (unless there are subtrusts for
each beneficiary). For many by-pass trusts, the beneficiaries will be the
surviving spouse and the children and so the surviving spouse normally
will be older and his or her life expectancy under the Single Life Table
without recalculation will govern the amounts of the MRDs. This is because
in most cases (like that of Homer Smith, e.g.) the estate is not so large that
a surviving spouse can live comfortably on just the income from the marital
share and his or her own assets. Planners often want the income (and
perhaps the corpus subject to an independent trustee’s discretion or an
ascertainable standard) of the by-pass trust at least available to a surviving
spouse. In the instant case, if Homer dies at age 86 and Mary is 83 in the
next year, the IRA would have to be emptied into the trust in 8.6 years.
If only the children are beneficiaries of a see-through by-pass trust, the
life expectancy of the oldest child would govern (unless subtrusts are created). For example, if Homer Smith were to die at age 86, and had named
only Homer Jr. (age 57 the next year) and Hortense (age 50 the next year)
as beneficiaries of his by-pass trust, Homer Jr.’s life expectancy under the
Single Life Table with no recalculation would govern and the IRA would
have to be paid out to the trust over 27.9 years. This offers substantially
more deferral than when Mary was also a beneficiary but possibly at the
price of Mary’s economic security.
This discussion illustrates how naming Q-TIP trusts or by-pass trusts for
spouses and children can very substantially reduce ‘stretch possibilities.’
Therefore, such trusts may not be desirable beneficiaries for retirement
plan accounts. Yet dependent on the circumstances, their use may be
a necessary trade-off of income-tax-deferral for other estate planning or
family advantages.

Trusts for Other Individuals (Children) as Beneficiaries
Such see-through trusts are governed by the same general principles as just
described for by-pass trusts for children only. They really offer essentially
the same deferral (or tax-free growth) opportunities as when children are
named directly. As noted above, the naming of comparatively young (and
healthy) children directly or in see-through trusts as beneficiaries can offer
very substantial income-tax-subsidized bequest opportunities.

Charitable Remainder Trusts (CRTs) as Beneficiaries
An attractive deferral strategy, in some situations, would be to have retirement plan benefits payable to a CRT at the participant’s or owner’s death
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with individuals (children, spouse and children, or others) as the unitrust
or annuity trust noncharitable income beneficiaries during their lifetimes.
A charity will then be the remainder beneficiary after the death of the last
noncharitable income beneficiary. The CRT strategy can be particularly
attractive when there are at least some younger noncharitable beneficiaries who are in reasonably good health and the participant or owner is
charitably inclined. Thus, a CRT can provide income, for example, over
the lifetimes (not just life expectancies) of spouse (who may be older) and
then of children who normally will be younger.
This strategy provides deferral because when the participant or owner
dies, the retirement plan account balance is paid to the CRT, which is
a tax-exempt entity, and hence no income tax is payable. Thus the full
account balance remains undiminished in the CRT to provide a unitrust or
annuity trust income to the noncharitable beneficiaries for their lifetimes.
A unitrust income interest from a charitable remainder unitrust (CRUT)
is a fixed percentage of each year’s value of the trust corpus, while an
annuity trust interest from a charitable remainder annuity trust (a CRAT)
is a fixed dollar amount each year. CRUTs generally are more flexible, and
if the investment performance of a CRUT is good, the unitrust amount
may increase over time thus providing some protection to the beneficiary
against long-term inflation.23 The unitrust rate must be at least 5 percent
and cannot be more than 50 percent. When a CRT is created (at the death
of the participant or owner), the actuarial value, using IRS tables, of the
charity’s remainder interest must be at least 10 percent of the trust’s value.
When the income interest is paid out to the beneficiaries, it is taxable to
them under a four tier system. This normally results in the income being
taxable as ordinary income when retirement plan benefits are used to fund
a CRT.
For illustrative purposes, let us return to the Smith case. Now suppose
Homer is charitably inclined and decides to leave $500,000 of his rollover
IRA to a 6 percent CRUT payable to Mary for her lifetime and then to their
children for their lifetimes; finally, when the last noncharitable beneficiary
has died, the remainder is to go to a charity (e.g., the University of Pennsylvania). He does this instead of naming a by-pass trust as beneficiary.24
At Homer’s death, say at age 86, 6 percent of the CRUT corpus (initially
$30,000) will be payable as ordinary income to Mary for as long as she actually lives (not just for her 8.6 years life expectancy as assumed in the by-pass
trust example).25 Then upon Mary’s death, say at age 86, the CRUT payout
will continue for the children’s lifetimes. If each child dies, say, at age 90,
this will be for 37 more years since Hortense will be 53 at Mary’s death. This
would result in deferral for Homer’s surviving family of 41 years.
Retirement plan benefits may also be made payable to a charitable
gift annuity plan. This approach would provide the noncharitable human
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beneficiary(ies) with a fixed life-annuity income (guaranteed by the charity) and based on the ages of the noncharitable beneficiaries and the gift
annuity rates offered by the charity.

Lump-Sum Distributions from Qualified Plans Containing
Appreciated Employer Securities
This strategy can be attractive and defer considerable wealth when a participant’s qualified retirement plan individual account contains a substantial
amount of appreciated employer securities. While some income tax must
be paid at the time of the distribution, there can be substantial deferral
of tax on most of it and the part represented by net unrealized appreciation (NUA) of employer securities will be taxed as long-term capital
gains (rather than ordinary income) when the securities are finally sold.
NUA is the difference between the value of the employer securities at
distribution and their basis to the plan (value when acquired by the plan
for the participant’s account).
As an example, let us assume that Homer Smith’s 401(k) account balance
is allocated $250,000 in a bond fund, $250,000 in a guaranteed investment
contract (GIC), and $1,000,000 in his employer’s (XYZ Corporation’s)
common stock. The basis of this employer stock to the plan is $300,000.
Homer has no income tax basis in his qualified retirement plan account
balance because none of his contributions (made before-tax), employer
matching contributions, or investment earnings on his account have ever
been taxed to him.
At age 65, Homer decides to take a lump-sum distribution of his entire
401(k) plan account balance in one taxable year. The tax result of this
would be as follows:
Lump-Sum Distribution
Less:
Homer’s Basis in Plan Account
Net Unrealized Appreciation (NUA)
on Employer Securities
($1,000,000 − $300,000)
Potentially Taxable Amount

$1,500,000
0
−700,000
$800,000

However, Homer also is able to do a partial rollover of the non-XYZ stock
portion of the total distribution (or $500,000) to his own traditional IRA.26
Thus, assuming such a partial rollover, Homer would only be taxed (as ordinary income) on $300,000 (the basis to the plan of the XYZ stock) in the
year of the total distribution. He would have received $1,000,000 worth of
XYZ stock with an income tax basis to him of $300,000 (because he paid tax
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on this amount) and $500,000 in a traditional rollover IRA (which he could
‘stretch’ as discussed previously). Presumably, he would take the tax on the
$300,000 of ordinary income from other non-retirement-plan assets so his
rollover IRA could remain undiminished for future tax deferral and he
would not have to sell any of the XYZ stock now and recognize capital gains.
Homer could then hold the XYZ stock as long as he wished and would
only recognize tax on the NUA (and any subsequent appreciation) when he
sold the stock and then at long-term capital gains rates, assuming he held
the stock for more than one year. If Homer dies before selling the XYZ
stock, it does not get a stepped-up income tax basis at death. Therefore,
his heirs also will recognize long-term capital gain when they later sell the
stock. Thus, there could be a long period of tax deferral possibly extending
into future generations.

Charitable Rollovers and Other Charitable Giving
The PPA of 2006 introduced an interesting approach to allowing direct
lifetime transfers of retirement assets to qualified charities. For 2006 and
2007 only, the law allows persons aged 701/2 or older to distribute up to
$100,000 per year from their IRAs to qualified charities without recognizing
taxable income, but also without being able to take a charitable income tax
deduction for the contribution. Such distributions also count toward the
person’s minimum required distribution for that year. Whether this lifetime
charitable giving provision will be extended beyond 2007 is uncertain. It is
strongly favored by the nonprofit charitable community.
In addition to CRTs and charitable rollovers, participants and owners can
name charities as beneficiaries or partial beneficiaries of non-Roth retirement plan account balances. As noted previously, this is perhaps the most
tax-efficient way to make desired charitable contributions at death because
(other than Roth IRAs) the retirement plan death benefits are IRD. Thus,
when payable to non-tax-exempt beneficiaries, they are included in the
decedent’s gross estate for federal estate tax purposes and are also ordinary
income when paid out to the beneficiaries (with an itemized income tax
deduction for any estate taxes paid on the benefit). In contrast, most
capital assets get a stepped-up income tax basis at death and hence pass
no accumulated capital gains to heirs.

Conclusions
The general objective of present tax law is to use tax incentives to encourage the provision of retirement income, not for tax-subsidized wealth
transfer or charitable giving. The main mechanism for enforcing this
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policy is the minimum distribution rules. In practice, however, these rules
and other tax law provisions now permit significant tax-favored wealth
transfer and charitable giving strategies. Hence, once there are adequate
resources for retirement, these strategies often are important in planning
retirement plan distributions. Strategies for using tax-favored retirement
plans as wealth transfer devices include spousal and nonspousal rollover
‘stretch IRAs’ strategy with its possible income-tax-deferral (or tax-free
growth) over two or more generations. Also, as minimum distribution
rules do not apply to Roth IRAs during the owner’s lifetime, this greatly
enhances their tax-free growth potential. Making retirement plan distributions payable to charities or charitable entities can also offer substantial tax
advantages. These and other interesting options have been extended by the
2006 PPA.

Appendix
Table 6-A1 Life Tables Used for Computing Minimum Required Distributions
Single Life Table

Single Life Table Cont.

Uniform Lifetime Table

Age

Life Expectancy

Age

Life Expectancy

Age of Employee

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

82.4
81.6
80.6
79.7
78.7
77.7
76.7
75.8
74.8
73.8
72.8
71.8
70.8
69.9
68.9
67.9
66.9
66.0
65.0
64.0

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

63.0
62.1
61.1
60.1
59.1
58.2
57.2
56.2
55.3
54.3
53.3
52.4
51.4
50.4
49.4
48.5
47.5
46.5
45.6
44.6

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Distribution Period
27.4
26.5
25.6
24.7
23.8
22.9
22.0
21.2
20.3
19.5
18.7
17.9
17.1
16.3
15.5
14.8
14.1
13.4
12.7
12.0
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Table 6-A1 (Continued)
Single Life Table

Single Life Table Cont.

Uniform Lifetime Table

Age

Life Expectancy

Age

Life Expectancy

Age of Employee

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

43.6
42.7
41.7
40.7
39.8
38.8
37.9
37.0
36.0
35.1
34.2
33.3
32.3
31.4
30.5
29.6
28.7
27.9
27.0
26.1
25.2
24.4
23.5
22.7
21.8
21.0
20.2
19.4
18.6
17.8
17.0
16.3
15.5
14.8
14.1
13.4

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111+

12.7
12.1
11.4
10.8
10.2
9.7
9.1
8.6
8.1
7.6
7.1
6.7
6.3
5.9
5.5
5.2
4.9
4.6
4.3
4.1
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.1
2.9
2.7
2.5
2.3
2.1
1.9
1.7
1.5
1.4
1.2
1.1
1.0

90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115+

Source: Federal Register (2002).

Distribution Period
11.4
10.8
10.2
9.6
9.1
8.6
8.1
7.6
7.1
6.7
6.3
5.9
5.5
5.2
4.9
4.5
4.2
3.9
3.7
3.4
3.1
2.9
2.6
2.4
2.1
1.9
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Notes
1
See, for example, Horneff et al. (2007: 1) where the authors view life annuities,
phased withdrawal plans, and blended portfolios of annuities and withdrawal plans
as means of converting retirement assets into income flows ‘so as not to exhaust
their funds too soon.’ Also see Bernheim (1991) and Hurd and Smith (1999) for
data on anticipated bequest motives of the elderly.
2
As discussed later, the income-tax-deferral (‘stretch’) strategy in some circumstances may come into conflict with estate planning goals that may call for
retirement benefits to be payable to a trust or trusts at the owner’s death. Thus,
income-tax-deferral may have to be sacrificed for estate tax savings or trustee
administration and control in some cases.
3
Reichenstein (2006) does not couch the analysis in terms of wealth transfer, but
rather focuses on lengths of possible lifetime distributions assuming the retiree’s
objective is to spend down a specified inflation-adjusted, after-tax annual amount
over an ∼30-year period. Interestingly, the strategy of sequencing lifetime distributions, first from taxable accounts and then from retirement accounts, does produce
longer distribution periods under the study’s ‘base case’ assumptions after about
30 years. But the difference in periods between (a) taxable first then retirement
plan distributions second (for a period of 30 years) and (b) retirement plan first
then taxable second (for a period of 27.4 years) turns out to be 2.6 years (or about
8.67 percent less than the 30 years); this gap does not seem particularly great to the
present author considering the time period involved. Further, when Reichenstein
changes his assumptions, so that common stocks are passively invested (in index
mutual funds or exchange traded funds) and assuming no stock turnover (with
no realized and recognized capital gains) until the end of the 30-year period,
the difference in periods narrows to 1.9 years or about 6.33 percent less than
30 years.
4
This conclusion is reinforced by the author’s work using a model projecting
accumulated wealth from age 65 to 95, starting with portfolios of $2 million in a
traditional IRA and $2 million in a taxable account containing stocks and bonds;
both accounts were allocated 60 percent to stocks and 40 percent to bonds, respectively. The model assumed a 9 percent average annual return on stocks (6 percent
long-term capital gains and 3 percent qualified dividends) and 6 percent return on
bonds, a 35 percent tax rate on ordinary income, a 15 percent rate on qualified
dividends and long-term capital gains, 75 percent unrealized capital gains on the
common stocks as of age 65, a 100 percent turnover rate on the stocks over the first
20 years with none thereafter, a step-up in basis at death at age 95, and no MRDs for
the sake of convenience. We assumed that the retiree needed a $400,000 after-tax
distribution for some purpose at age 65 from one of these accounts. We found that
the sequencing of the distribution from the taxable account and not from the IRA
(rather than the reverse) produced the best wealth accumulation results, but the
difference was only 4.22 percent more by age 95. This difference would have been
even less, if required minimum distributions had been taken from the IRA.
5
A combination of these elements lies in having retirement plan assets payable to
a charitable remainder trust (CRT) with family members the noncharitable unitrust
or annuity trust beneficiaries. This approach is described infra.
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6
A federal estate tax return must be filed by the executor or administrator of
the estate of a deceased US citizen or resident alien when the value of his or her
gross estate exceeds a threshold amount, which is the applicable exclusion amount
for the year of death less any taxable gifts made after 1976. In recent years, this
applicable exclusion amount has ranged from $600,000 in 1987; $1,000,000 by 2002;
$2,000,000 in 2006, 2007, and 2008; and is scheduled to increase to $3,500,000 in
2009, with the estate tax being repealed in 2010, and then the estate tax returning in
2011 with an applicable exclusion amount of $1,000,000, unless there are legislative
changes in the meantime. Thus, the number of estate tax returns actually filed has
declined over these years.
7
The person may take his or her first MRD by December 31 of the year in which
he or she attains age 701/2 (his or her first distribution calendar year) or wait until
April 1 of the following year in which case he or she must take two distributions that
year.
8
The minimum distribution rules apply to defined benefit (DB) plans as well
as defined contribution (DC) plans. However, the life-annuity payouts under DB
pension plans typically meet these rules.
9
If the actual sole beneficiary is the participant’s or owner’s spouse, who is more
than 10 years younger than the participant or owner, the MRD may be calculated
using a Joint and Last Survivor Table that will produce lower divisors (hence lower
MRDs) than the Uniform Lifetime Table.
10
If the deceased spouse died before his or her RBD, distributions to the surviving
spouse beneficiary must begin by the later of December 31 of the year following the
year of the decedent’s death or December 31 of the year the decedent would have
attained age 701/2 . If the deceased spouse died on or after his or her RBD, distributions to the surviving spouse must begin by December 31 of the year following the
decedent’s death and may be payable over the longer of the surviving spouse’s life
expectancy or what would have been the decedent’s life expectancy. It may also be
noted that the tax law and the IRS do not use the term ‘inherited IRA’ in the case of
a spousal beneficiary. But that term is commonly used in the case of any individual
beneficiary and is so used here.
11
See, for example; Kennedy, Kent, and Weger (2006); Blyskal (1993); and Hoyt
(2005).
12
Only a surviving spouse can roll over or treat as his or her own account balance
as just described. Other individual (nonspouse) beneficiaries can transfer a decedent’s
qualified plan account balance to an inherited IRA for the beneficiary (potentially
payable over the beneficiary’s fixed period single life expectancy) but in the name
of the decedent, or can have the decedent’s IRA treated as an inherited IRA for
the beneficiary in the same fashion. But for nonspouse beneficiaries, this is not the
same as the spouse’s rolling over to or treating as his or her own IRA.
13
Homer could wait to take his first minimum distribution until April 1 of the
calendar year following his 701/2 years and then take another distribution for
that year by December 31 of that year. However, he decides not to ‘double up’
distributions for that year and to take his first minimum distribution by December
31 of his 701/2 years.
14
This is simply one divided by the applicable distribution period or 27.4 at age 70.
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15

Using the favorable Uniform Lifetime Table, in this case the required minimum
distributions will be less than the 6 percent investment return from the IRA until
Homer reaches age 83. This will be true as long as 100 divided by the investment
return inside the IRA is less than the applicable distribution period. In this case,
100 ÷ 6 = 16.67. The distribution period for age 82 is 17.1 years.
16
As is discussed later under the heading ‘Possible Problems with Spousal Rollover
“Stretch IRAs”,’ since the IRA balance represents such a large part of Homer’s gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes, it is possible that there will not be enough
nonretirement probate assets in his estate to fund fully the credit-shelter trust for an
optimal marital in this case. As described later, this represents a planning dilemma
and the solution may be either to use some of the retirement assets to fund the
credit-shelter trust or gift (and thus not have them payable to the surviving spouse)
or to underfund the credit-shelter trust or gift.
17
It may be noted that while we assume both Homer and Mary died at age 86
(which was their life expectancy at age 65), and left a substantial IRA account
balance for their children, had they lived beyond age 86 and continued taking
minimum distributions, they would never have completely exhausted the IRA. This
is because under the Uniform Lifetime Table their life expectancy is recalculated at
each age.
18
Still another possibility under these circumstances is for the amount (or part of
the amount) of retirement plan assets that otherwise would go into a by-pass or
credit-shelter trust to be made payable to a CRUT or annuity trust (CRAT) with
the surviving spouse and then the children as noncharitable beneficiaries of the
charitable remainder trust for their respective lifetimes (Hoyt 2002b).
19
Trust income tax rates are the same as individual rates, except trusts do not have
a 10 percent bracket. However, trust income tax brackets are very compressed and
so the taxable income of trusts reaches the top 35 percent rate much more quickly
than for individual taxpayers. For example, as of 2007 trust tax rates reach the top
35 percent rate after only $10,450 of taxable income, while individuals do not reach
the top bracket until after $349,700 of taxable income.
20
In this case, Homer probably would roll over his qualified 401(k) plan account
balance to his own IRA before naming the Q-TIP trust as beneficiary. IRAs are not
subject to REA so Mary would not have to consent to a beneficiary designation other
than herself.
21
The trustee of the Q-TIP trust must withdraw each year from the IRA the larger
of the MRD or the income inside the IRA for that year for estate tax reasons. The
surviving spouse must receive the larger of the income inside the IRA or the trust’s
income. However, at Mary’s age the MRDs would likely exceed the IRA income.
22
In this case, the surviving spouse will receive the larger of the MRD or the income
inside the IRA each year, and at Mary’s age this will very likely be the MRD.
23
Of course, if the reverse is true, the CRUT income stream will decline.
24
A CRUT can be made to qualify for the federal estate tax marital deduction if the
surviving spouse is the only noncharitable beneficiary. It then can be used instead
of, say, a Q-TIP trust. But in this case a charity and not the children would be the
remainder person after the spouse’s death. If the children are also named as CRT
beneficiaries as just described, there would be no marital deduction for the CRT at
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Homer’s death, but there would be a small estate tax charitable deduction for the
actuarial value of the charitable remainder interest as of the date of Homer’s death.
Thus, planners may recommend a CRUT for spouse and children as a substitute
for a by-pass trust since a by-pass trust does not qualify for the marital deduction
anyway. See Hoyt (2002b). Of course, if the estate is not large enough to attract
federal estate tax, this factor does not matter.
25
If the net investment income inside the CRUT (which would be income-tax-free
to the CRUT) exceeds the unitrust payout (6 percent assumed here), the value of
the CRUT corpus will grow and so will future unitrust payouts. But if CRUT net
investment income does not match payouts, CRUT corpus will be used to make up
the difference, and the reverse will be true. Thus, there is some investment risk, as
well as opportunity, in this strategy.
26
After the Pension Act of 2006, he could also roll over part or all of this amount to
a Roth IRA, if he meets the eligibility requirements to convert to a Roth, but then
he would be taxed on the amount being rolled over to the Roth.
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